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JUDICIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA IN
CORPORATE LAW: CONFUSING
THE STANDARD OF CARE WITH
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
FRED W. TRIEM*
Courts are confusing the Business Judgment Rule with the
standard of care that governs the conduct of corporate directors
and officers. The Alaska Supreme Court declared in recent
dictum that the Business Judgment Rule has been codified in
Alaska Statute section 10.06.450(b), the directors’ duty-of-care
statute. The court deviated from well-established principles of
corporate law by confusing the corporate directors’ statutory
standard of care with the Business Judgment Rule, a widelyapplied, but uncodified, common law rule about the standard of
directors’ liability for their mistakes. The former is an ex-ante
measuring stick by which directors’ decisions are guided; the latter
is a presumption of correctness and a safe harbor that protects
business decisions from ex-post review in the courts. This
Comment identifies this common error of law, describes the
difference between these two concepts, explains why many state
and federal courts across the nation are confused, and credits the
courts that have already discovered the error. It concludes with
some reasons why the Business Judgment Rule should not be
codified.

I. INTRODUCTION: A FIERY BEGINNING
The Business Judgment Rule (“BJR”) first appeared in
Alaska in 1975 after a fire destroyed a small factory in Fairbanks
1
that was owned by Alaska Plastics, Inc. The fire caused the end of
production at the factory, terminated operation of the enterprise,
and triggered the beginning of a lawsuit that brought the arrival of
2
the BJR in Alaska. To Alaska Plastics’ everlasting woe, its

* B.S., University of Notre Dame; J.D., Creighton University. The author is
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1. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980).
2. Id. at 270.
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directors had decided not to obtain any fire insurance on the
facility.3 Annoyed by this foolish decision, Patricia Coppock, a
minority shareholder, filed a derivative action against the directors
in which she complained that the directors had breached their duty
4
of care.
In Alaska Plastics, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the
trial court’s rejection of the dissident shareholder’s complaint
5
about lack of fire insurance and other directorial misconduct. The
supreme court held that the directors’ decision not to insure the
property was protected by the BJR, and therefore it would not be
6
reviewed by the court. This was the first time the Alaska Supreme
Court had discussed or applied the BJR. The court’s most recent
7
BJR case, Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., is substantially more
controversial, as it mistakenly asserts that the BJR is codified in
8
Alaska Statute section 10.06.450(b), confusing the common law
9
rule with the codified corporate directors’ standard of care.
This Comment traces the history of the BJR in Alaska. It
explains where and how the court has erred in its definition of the
rule; it explains the difference between two concepts—standard of
directors’ care and standard of directors’ liability—and their
10
separate treatment in the Model Act. It also collects examples of
the same judicial misunderstanding from the case law of other
states. It concludes that the BJR has not been codified in Alaska
nor in most other U.S. jurisdictions, although there have been re11
cent suggestions to do so in the Model Act and in the American
12
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance. Finally, this
Comment provides reasons why the BJR should not be codified.

3. Id. at 273.
4. Id. at 278.
5. Id. The dissident shareholder complained that “the directors failed to
insure the Fairbanks plant, they kept large reserves of cash in noninterest-bearing
checking accounts, and they loaned an employee money at a rate below prevailing
rates of interest.” Id.
6. Id.
7. 42 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2002).
8. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006).
9. See Shields, 42 P.3d at 1083.
10. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2005).
11. Id. § 8.31.
12. 1 AM. LAW INST ., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994).
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II. A WRONG TURN IN ALASKA’S CORPORATE LAW
Since its first appearance in the Alaska Plastics decision, the
Business Judgment Rule has received only occasional mention in
13
subsequent decisions of the supreme court. That is, until the court
14
decided Shields v. Cape Fox Corp. in 2002. In Shields, the court
confused the BJR with the directors’ statutory standard of care that
15
The court
is codified in Alaska Statute section 10.06.450(b).
erroneously referred to a statutory formulation of the BJR: “The
business judgment rule is set out in AS 10.06.450(b). It requires a
director to use ‘the care . . . that an ordinarily prudent person in a
16
like position would use under similar circumstances.’”
17
For the reasons explained below, this dictum is contrary to
the great weight of modern corporate law and should be
repudiated. However, Alaska is not alone in making this mistake;
18
courts in several other jurisdictions have made the same error.

13. In the twenty years after Alaska Plastics, the BJR received brief mention
in four reported decisions. See Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691, 697 nn.21–22
(Alaska 1999) (applying the BJR to condominium associations and giving a useful
statement of the rule); Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc., 960 P.2d 606, 608 n.1
(Alaska 1998) (quoting an argument of counsel in which the phrase “business
judgment rule” appears); Wirum & Cash, Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692, 702
(Alaska 1992) (“Alaska recognizes the business judgement [sic] rule.”); O’Buck v.
Cottonwood Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 750 P.2d 813, 817 n.4 (Alaska 1988) (analogizing
between the BJR and condominium association rule). The next decision in which
the term “business judgment rule” appeared was Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091–92.
14. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091 (“The business judgment rule is set out in AS
10.06.450(b).”). In the five years since its decision in Shields, the Alaska Supreme
Court has not applied the BJR, although the term “business judgment rule” does
appear in three recent decisions. See Matanuska Elec. Ass’n v. Waterman, 87 P.3d
820, 822 (Alaska 2004); Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Transp. and
Pub. Facilities, 71 P.3d 865, 876 (Alaska 2003); Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736, 750
(Alaska 2003).
15. Alaska Statute section 10.06.450, titled “Board of directors; duty of care;
right of inspection; failure to dissent,” provides, in relevant part:
(b) A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties as a
member of a committee of the board on which the director may serve, in
good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care, including reasonable
inquiry, that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances.
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450 (2006).
16. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091–92 (emphasis added).
17. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.D.
18. See discussion infra Part III. Examples are collected in the Appendix.
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A. What is the Business Judgment Rule?
The essence of the BJR is deference to directors’ decisionmaking based on judicial unwillingness to re-examine a business
decision and judicial reluctance to discourage directors from risk19
20
taking. The BJR is characterized by a number of features. First,
the BJR applies to business decisions that have been made by
corporate directors and officers by supplying a presumption of
21
22
correctness. Second, the BJR requires a judgment or decision.
19. There are three principal formulations of the Business Judgment Rule: (1)
the Delaware rule, (2) the ALI rule, and (3) the Model Act rule. See R. Franklin
Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging The Business Judgment Rule, 48 B US .
L AW. 1337, 1337–39 (1993) (explaining the “three major positions on the business
judgment rule”); see also Meredith M. Brown & William I. Phillips, The Business
Judgment Rule: Burks v. Lasker and Other Recent Developments, 6 J. Corp. L. 453,
454–61 (1981) (discussing the policy behind the business judgment rule and
outlining the necessary conditions for its application); Charles Hansen, The Duty
of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and The American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355, 1363–68 (1993) (outlining the elements of
the BJR).
20. An introduction to the BJR can be found in several popular texts and
treatises on the law of corporations. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M.
BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 8.03[C], at 209–14 (2d ed.
2004); 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 12, § 4.01(c) & cmt. at 172–86 (providing the
ALI’s formulation of the BJR); W ILLIAM L. CARY & M ELVIN A RON
E ISENBERG , CASES AND MATERIALS ON C ORPORATIONS 592–634 (7th ed.
1995); J AMES D. C OX & T HOMAS L. HAZEN, C OX & H AZEN ON
C ORPORATIONS § 15.07 (2d ed. 2003); FRANK H. E ASTERBROOK & D ANIEL R.
F ISCHEL , T HE E CONOMIC S TRUCTURE OF C ORPORATE L AW 93–100 (1991);
M ELVIN A RON EISENBERG , T HE S TRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 13–17
(1976) (discussing various types of business decisions); ROBERT W.
HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 800–817 (8th ed. 2003); 3A W ILLIAM M EADE FLETCHER ET AL .,
F LETCHER C YCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF P RIVATE C ORPORATIONS §§ 1036–40,
at 37–52 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 3A 1994); R OBERT W. HAMILTON, T HE LAW OF
C ORPORATIONS IN A N UTSHELL §§ 14.4–.5, (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
HAMILTON NUTSHELL] (distinguishing the standard of care and the BJR); H ARRY
G. H ENN & J OHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF C ORPORATIONS § 242 (3d ed.
1983); DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J., THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE
CONTROL—A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 71–73 (1986); JAMES
A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY § 2:2.3[A][3], at 2-26 (2d ed.
2006) (noting that the rationale for the BJR “is institutional, economic, and
psychological”).
21. See H AMILTON N UTSHELL , supra note 20, § 14.5, at 453. The
presumption component of the BJR is developed in Balotti & Hanks, supra note
19, at 1339–50. It is also discussed in DOUGLAS M. BRANSON , CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.13 (1993) (discussing “something above and beyond the routine
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Third, the BJR protects corporate directors and officers from
liability for mistakes that were made in business decisions, even
when such a decision proves to have been unsound or downright
23
Finally, the BJR supplies judicial restraint and
erroneous.
abstention, for it furnishes a deferential standard of review by
which courts will abstain from second guessing the directors’
24
business decisions.
The BJR insulates corporate directors from those decisions
that are within their authority and are not tainted by fraud or self25
The BJR is a venerable common law rule26 that is
dealing.
recognized and applied by courts everywhere to protect directors
when they are acting within the scope of their corporate authority:
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors
will not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders,

presumption of regularity”). The BJR protects officers as well as directors. Id.
§ 7.03 & n.31. But see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 458–69 (2005) (arguing against the application
of the business judgment rule to protect corporate officers who are not also
directors).
22. See, e.g., D OUGLAS M. B RANSON , N O S EAT AT THE T ABLE 56 (2007)
(“One salient feature of the rule is that the directors must have made a judgment
or decision—the rule does not protect directors who do nothing.”).
23. H AMILTON N UTSHELL , supra note 20, §14.5, at 453 (“Decisions made
by the board of directors upon reasonable information and with some
rationality do not give rise to directorial liability even if they turn out badly
or disastrously.”). Even the fertile young minds of law students could not devise
a better example of a business decision gone awry than the parsimonious mistake
of Alaska Plastics’ directors: not buying fire insurance to protect its only
production facility.
24. The abstention feature of the BJR is developed in Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
25. For a useful summary of the rule and its purpose as a shield to protect
directors, see Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496
N.E.2d 959, 963 (Ohio 1986) (“The business judgment rule is a principle of
corporate law that has been part of the common law for at least one hundred fifty
years.”). The historical roots of the BJR are reviewed in S. Samuel Arsht, The
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97–100 (1979).
26. The common law origin of the BJR is discussed in M ELVIN A RON
E ISENBERG , T HE NATURE OF THE C OMMON L AW 38–39 (1988) (giving a brief
statement of the Business Judgment Rule and its policy bases). In the era before
codification vel non became a disputed topic, the rule’s common law genesis was
axiomatic: “Under the common law, courts are disposed to give directors a wide
latitude in the management of a corporation’s affairs, as long as they reasonably
exercise an honest, unbiased judgment. This is often referred to as the ‘business
judgment rule.’” 1 WILLIAM E. K NEPPER , L IABILITY OF C ORPORATE O FFICERS
AND D IRECTORS , § 1.08, at 20 (3d ed. 1978) (footnote omitted).
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and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of
their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that
appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain exceptions
apply. Put another way, the rule is “a presumption that in
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that
27
the action was taken in the best interests of the company.

The exceptions referred to by Dean Clark are “managerial fraud
28
and self-dealing.”
The BJR provides a safe harbor to directors only for decisions
in which they have discretion and for which they are permitted to
choose between rational business alternatives.
The correct
expression of the BJR is seen in Alaska Plastics: “Judges are not
business experts, a fact which has become expressed in the
so-called ‘business judgment rule.’ The essence of that doctrine is
that courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the
29
board of directors unless the board’s decisions are unreasonable.”
Alaska Plastics provides an excellent example of judicial
deference to business decisions. In that case, the shareholderplaintiff complained that the defendant-directors were negligent in

27. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, §3.4, at 123–24 (1986)
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (footnote omitted); see
also BRANSON, supra note 21, §7.01–.17; see generally, 1–2 DENNIS J. BLOCK,
NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998). Two frequently
cited expressions of the BJR in the case law are Aronson and Joy v. North, 692
F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982). A useful analysis can be found in United Artists
Theater Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2003). The BJR is the focal point
of the most famous—some might say infamous—corporate law case in our life
time: Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871–73 (Del. 1985) (holding the BJR is
not a defense for directors who acted with haste, failed to consult outside
professionals, and failed to make adequate inquiry about the terms of a proposed
merger).
28. CLARK, supra note 27, §3.5, at 140.
29. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980) (citation
omitted). The introductory phrase “judges are not business experts,” which
Justice Connor derives from Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919), is not the BJR but merely a statement of one principal policy basis for the
rule (among several). This often-quoted phrase is discussed in Bainbridge, supra
note 24, at 117–23 (noting that “this too is an incomplete explanation for the
business judgment rule” and offering an alternative that judges “have an incentive
to duck these cases” because “many judges are ‘radically incompetent’”); id. at
119 (quoting Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of
Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 754, 758 (2000) (noting that “courts
have trouble understanding the simplest of business relationships” and that
“[t]heir frequent failure to understand transactions is well-documented”)).
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failing to insure company property—a plant in Fairbanks—and that
they kept large amounts of cash in non-interest-bearing checking
30
accounts, thus violating the directors’ duty of care. The court
rejected these arguments for the reason expressed in the quoted
31
passage above: the directors have discretion about insurance and
banking practices, and a court should show deference because
32
“[j]udges are not business experts.”
B. Distinguishing the Directors’ Standard of Care and
the Business Judgment Rule
The key difference between the standard of care and the
Business Judgment Rule is that the standard of care defines ex ante
the conduct to which directors must aspire while the BJR is an ex
33
post standard of review applied by the courts. Although some
courts fail to distinguish between the standard of care and the BJR,
legal scholars have recognized the distinction between these two
34
doctrines. The standard of care and the BJR are often confused
because “[i]n many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and
35
standards of review are identical.” But these standards are not
identical in the law of corporations:

30. Coppock, 621 P.2d at 278.
31. Id.
32. Id. Alaska Plastics also explains that the BJR does not protect directors
who violate the rights of shareholders. For example, in Alaska Plastics, the court
recognized that management could not avoid liability if it violated the
shareholders’ right to equal treatment in the matter of dividends: “[I]f a
stockholder is being unjustly deprived of dividends that should be his, a court of
equity will not permit management to cloak itself in the immunity of the business
judgment rule.” Id. (quoting Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1959))
(alteration in original).
33. Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty Of Finest Loyalty
And Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule In Unincorporated
Business Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 352–53 (2005) (“It is important
to note the difference between the standard of care, which is the standard of
conduct expected of directors in their decision making, and the business judgment
rule, which is the standard of review that determines whether directors will be
held liable for a poor decision.”); see also LEWIS D. S OLOMON, DONALD E.
S CHWARTZ , JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, & ELLIOT J. WEISS, CORPORATIONS: LAW
AND P OLICY , 705–710 (4th ed. 1998) (distinguishing between due care and the
BJR).
34. A useful discussion is found in HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra note 20,
§§ 14.4–.5.
35. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 602 (“A standard of conduct states
how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role. A standard of
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An identity between standards of conduct and standards of
review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that the
two kinds of standards may diverge in any given area—that is,
the standard of conduct that states how an actor should conduct
himself may differ from the standard of review by which courts
determine whether to impose liability on the basis of the actor’s
conduct. . . .
36
The duty of care is a leading example of this divergence.

To illustrate, Professor Douglas Branson explains that a
director’s conduct must meet a standard of due care:
[T]he standard of care applicable to corporate directors remains
due care. As the Model Business Corporation Act and the
Indiana statute phrase it, a director is to discharge her duties
“with the care an ordinarily reasonably prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances.” The
standard of conduct is not “slight care,” or “gross negligence,” or
anything other than due care. . . . With that established, the
business judgment rule may be the de facto standard of conduct
in cases in which directors are proactive, making a judgment or
decision, that may be a deliberative decision to take no action, as
37
opposed to cases of complete nonfeasance.

The directors have many duties under the standard of care,
including the duty of monitoring, the duty of inquiry, the duty to
make reasonable and prudent decisions regarding matters upon
which the board is obligated or chooses to act, and also the duty to
38
employ a reasonable decision-making process.
review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to
determine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief.”).
36. Id. (“For example, the standard of conduct that governs an automobile
driver is that he should drive carefully. Correspondingly, the standard of review in
a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully. The standard of
conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal that
involves the subject matter of the agency is that the agent must deal fairly.
Correspondingly, the standard of review in a liability claim by the principal against
the agent based on such a transaction is whether the agent dealt fairly.”).
Professor Eisenberg’s complete explanation can be found in Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993).
37. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule – The Business Judgment
Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 631, 638 (2002) (footnote omitted); see also
RICHARD W. JENNINGS & RICHARD M. BUXBAUM , CORPORATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 171–99 (5th ed. 1979).
38. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 602; 1 AM. LAW INST ., supra
note 12, § 4.01(a) (“A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform
the director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care
that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a
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In contrast, the BJR is a presumption of correctness for
business decisions applied by the courts to shield directors from
liability, even if the decision is unreasonable. The BJR precludes
the court from examining the merits of a business decision unless
the directors were grossly negligent.
Where the business judgment rule applies, a director will not be
held liable for a decision, “even one that is unreasonable” and
results in a loss to the corporation, so long as the director was
not grossly negligent in reaching the decision. Furthermore,
while the plaintiff is required to show gross negligence in order
to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule,
proof of a grossly negligent decision alone is not sufficient to set
aside the decision or yield an award of damages. Liability may
be avoided in the absence of causation or damages, or where the
directors can establish the fairness of the challenged transaction.
The decision, in such instances, will be respected, and the
39
directors will not be exposed to personal liability.

According to the official comments to the Model Business
Corporation Act, the drafters purposely left it to the courts to sort
out the relationship, if any, between directors’ statutory duty of
40
care and the BJR. Table I summarizes the difference between
these two concepts.

like position and under similar circumstances.”). The American Law Institute’s
formulation of the duty of care is similar to the Model Act’s, and thus it is similar
to the law of Alaska and most states.
39. Miller, supra note 33, at 352–53 (footnotes omitted); see also S OLOMON ET
AL ., supra note 33, at 705–710 (distinguishing between due care and the BJR).
40. M ODEL B US. C ORP . ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-163 (3d ed. 2005 Supp.)
(“The elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances for its
application are continuing to be developed by the courts.”).
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Table I: Differences between the standard of care and the BJR:

Directors’ Standard of Care
Standard of conduct for
directors & officers
Guidelines to advise a
director or officer in
contemplation of board
action
How a director should
conduct a given activity or
make a decision
Fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty
Aspirational goals for
present and future conduct;
guides directors
Requires an informed
judgment or decision
Forward looking; operates
ex ante
Codified; MBCA § 8.30;
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450.

Business Judgment Rule
Standard of review for use
by courts
Liability test a court should
apply when it reviews a
director’s or officer’s conduct
Limits the use of liability
rules against directors to
evaluate their performance
Not a description of a duty
or standard
Presumption of correctness
of completed acts; a safe
harbor to protect directors
An abstention doctrine in
which courts will not
interfere with business
decisions
Retrospective; operates ex
post
Not codified; a common law
rule

C. The Standard Matters
When a court uses the wrong legal standard, confusing the
standard of conduct with the standard of review, the mistake can
be outcome determinative. In Shields, the Supreme Court of
Alaska compounded the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction
(which incorporated the wrong legal standard) by approving the
instruction with the mistaken holding that it made no difference:
Defendants contend that Jury Instruction Nos. 14 and 15
concerning Martinez’s liability as a director of the corporation
were plain error because they did not reflect the business
judgment rule. The business judgment rule is set out in AS
10.06.450(b). It requires a director to use the care. . .that an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances. As such, liability under the business
judgment rule does not differ appreciably from negligence
liability—the standard used in Instructions Nos. 14 and 15. Thus
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it was
not plain error to fail to instruct on the business judgment
41
rule.

The court’s mistake was in saying that liability under the business
judgment rule “does not differ appreciably” from negligence
42
liability. The court was flat wrong in equating the BJR with a
classical negligence standard. Most courts that have reached the
issue have said that a plaintiff who sues a director must overcome
the BJR’s presumption of correctness and then must establish gross
negligence (followed by causation and damages) in order to
43
recover.
In a suit against a corporate director or officer for breach of
the duty of care, the plaintiff cannot simply show a violation of the
duty of care statute, such as section 10.06.450(b). Instead, the
plaintiff must show gross negligence to overcome the director’s
protection of the BJR. Without such a showing, the BJR’s safe
harbor insulates the director from liability for defective decision
making. In summary, a violation of the standard of care does not
automatically translate into a violation of the standard of liability.
In corporate law, the standards of conduct diverge from the
44
standards of review; they are not synonymous.
Thus, the Shields court made three mistakes. First, it confused
the codified standard of care with the common law’s BJR. Second,
it declared the standard of care to be a codification of the BJR.
Third, it adopted the wrong legal standard by choosing ordinary
negligence instead of gross negligence to evaluate the director’s
conduct.
D. The Business Judgment Rule is Not Codified
45
Shields v. Cape Fox Corp. asserts that Alaska Statute
46
47
section 10.06.450(b) is the BJR. However, despite widespread

41. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091–92 (italics added; internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
42. See id.
43. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[U]nder the
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross
negligence . . . .”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 930 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D.
Ariz. 1994) (“[T]he court could find no case in which a court held that the business
judgment rule could be overcome by a showing of mere negligence. If it could, the
rule would provide very little protection to directors.”). The only counterexample is Theriot v. Bourg, 691 So.2d 213, 222 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
the standard for imposing liability on directors is not gross negligence).
44. Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 443–45.
45. 42 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2002).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450 (2006).
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adoption of the Model Act in Alaska and elsewhere, “the [BJR]
remains uncodified.”48 Alaska’s version of the Model Act, section
49
10.06.450(b), and its parallel, section 10.06.483(e) (the duty of care
50
for corporate officers), is not the BJR but is simply a statutory
“Standard[] of Conduct for Directors” that codifies their duty of
51
care. To this end, the principal authorities on the topic agree that
52
the BJR remains uncodified in all jurisdictions. Indeed, neither
the original Model Business Corporation Act of 1969 nor its
53
revision in 1984 makes any claim of codifying the BJR. The 1984
54
version expressly states the contrary.

47. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091 (“The business judgment rule is set out in AS
10.06.450(b).”).
48. Branson, supra note 37, at 632–33.
49. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006).
50. Id. § 10.06.483(e) (2006) (“An officer shall perform the duties of the office
in good faith and with that degree of care, including reasonable inquiry, that an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances.”).
51. “Standards of Conduct for Directors” is the title of section 8.30 of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA), MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.30 (2005), which in turn replicates former Model Business Code Act (MBCA)
section 35, MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 35 (1969) (amended 1973), from which
Alaska’s present law has descended, ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b). The legislative
history—the Official Comment—of section 10.06.450 of the Alaska Statutes
describes the purpose of the law as “the articulation of a standard for the
discharge of the duty of care which must be observed by directors” and “the duty
of care to be observed by a corporate director.” Similarly, the Comment to
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450 describes one of its purposes as to provide “a definition
of the standard of care according to which officers are to discharge their
responsibilities to the corporation.” 1987 H OUSE -S ENATE J OINT J OURNAL
S UPPLEMENT No. 9, 98–101, 113 (May 7, 1987) (providing the Alaska Code
Revision Commission’s official commentary on Chapter 10.06 of the Alaska
Corporations Code). The Comment to ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.483 is similar (“a
definition of the standard of care” for officers).
52. See e.g., BLOCK ET AL., supra note 27, at 100–06 (“The [ABA] Committee
on Corporate Laws determined that the rule is better left as an uncodified
equitable doctrine.”); see also F LETCHER ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 1035–40.
53. M ODEL B US . C ORP. A CT § 8.30 (1984). According to the official
comments, the drafters purposely left it to the courts to sort out the relationship, if
any, between directors’ statutory duty of care and the business judgment rule.
M ODEL B US . C ORP . A CT § 8.30 cmt. (1984).
54. MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-163 (3d ed. 2005 Supp.) (“Section 8.30
does not try to codify the business judgment rule.”), reprinted in BRANSON, supra
note 21, § 7.01 n.8; see id. § 7.02, at 328 (“The business judgment rule is by and
large uncodified.”); see also F LETCHER ET AL., supra note 20, § 1038 (“The
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The error in Shields v. Cape Fox Corp. can be understood by
examining the Model Act’s treatment of the standard of care and
55
of the BJR in sections 8.30 and 8.31, respectively. The Alaska
duty of care statute, section 10.06.450(b) is taken almost verbatim
from section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
56
(RMBCA). Alaska’s statute adds only an express requirement of
57
“reasonable inquiry” to the Model Act’s language. In all other
respects, the operative clauses are identically worded. Instead of
being
a
codification of
the
BJR,
Alaska
Statute
section 10.06.450(b) and RMBCA section 8.30 are codifications of
58
the common law duty of care applicable to corporate directors.
The Official Comment to RMBCA section 8.30 makes this clear:
“[t]he elements of the [BJR] and the circumstances for its
application are continuing to be developed by the courts. Section
8.30 does not try to codify the BJR or to delineate the differences
between that defensive rule and the section’s standards of director
59
conduct.”
In an effort to reduce the confusion about the duty of care in
section 8.30 (Standards of Conduct for Directors), a new section
was added to the revised Model Act in 1999. The new section,
section 8.31 (Standards of Liability for Directors), arguably is a
partial codification of the BJR, or at least a suggestion or proposal
for codification. The Official Comment to section 8.31 explains that
the BJR is a common law rule, not a statute: “the operative elements of
the standard of judicial review commonly referred to as the BJR have
been widely recognized [and] courts have used a number of different
60
word formulations to articulate the concept.” “Section 8.31 does not
61
codify the [BJR] as a whole.”
business judgment rule has not been expressly codified in any state corporation
statute nor in any version of the Model Business Corporation Act.”).
55. 42 P.3d 1083, 1091 (Alaska 2002) (“The business judgment rule is set out
in AS 10.06.450(b).”).
56. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006), with MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 8.30 (2005).
57. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (“and with the care, including
reasonable inquiry . . .”).
58. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.04 (“Relationship of the Business
Judgment Rule to the Duty of Care”). The difference between the duty of care
and the Business Judgment Rule is also explained in HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra
note 20, §§ 14.4–.5, which also distinguishes the different roles of RMBCA §§ 8.30
and 8.31.
59. 2 MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-163 (3d ed. 2005 Supp.), reprinted in
BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.01 n.8.
60. Id. at 8-67.
61. Id.
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Even assuming that section 8.31 codifies part of the BJR,
however, it has been adopted by only three states, and Alaska is not
62
one of them. Thus, the only possible conclusion is that Alaska
Statute section 10.06.450(b) is not the BJR.
Professor Robert Hamilton supports this conclusion by
distinguishing the diverse roles of RMBCA Sections 8.30 and 8.31:
A critical and sometimes misunderstood principle is that § 8.30 is
not the operative test for determining whether directors are
liable for damages for failing to exercise reasonable care. The
proper test for liability is the “[BJR]” described in the following
section [§ 14.5] of this Nutshell. The 1999 amendments to the
Model Act make this crystal clear: The revised § 8.30 is entitled
“Standards of Conduct for Directors,” while a completely new
§ 8.31, entitled “Standards of Liability for Directors,” is added.
Essentially, § 8.31 codifies the “[BJR]” described in the
following section [§ 14.5, of this Nutshell].
....
In a word, one should not look at the provisions of revised § 8.30
of MBCA (1984) to determine whether directors are personally
63
responsible for bad decisions.

There has been only one attempt at a full codification of the
BJR—but not by a legislature. When drafting a restatement of the
law of corporations, the American Law Institute (ALI) distilled the
common law BJR into this formulation, titled “Duty of Care of
Directors and Officers; the [BJR]”:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good
faith fulfills the duty under this Section [4.01] if the director or
officer:
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business
judgment is in the
64
best interests of the corporation.

Although still relatively new, the ALI formulation of the BJR has
been adopted by some state courts—but not codified by their
65
respective legislatures. Even the ALI has recognized that “[t]here
62. The three states that have adopted § 8.31 are Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §
30-1-831 (2006); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 490.831 (2006); and Mississippi, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-4-8.31 (2006).
63. HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra note 20, § 14.4, at 449–50.
64. AM. LAW INST., supra note 12, § 4.01(c).
65. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Conn.
1994); Omni Bank v. United S. Bank, 607 So.2d 76, 86 (Miss. 1992); cf. Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 n.47 (Del. 2000) (“Because [the American Law
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are no statutory formulations of the [BJR].”66 Professor Branson
confirms that the BJR is “by and large uncodified,” despite the ALI’s
67
proposed codification in section 4.01(c).
III. ALASKA’S COURTS ARE NOT ALONE IN
CONFUSING THE DIRECTORS’ STANDARD OF CARE WITH THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
More than a dozen courts have confused the difference
between the directors’ standard of care and the Business Judgment
Rule. Forty states have adopted the Model Act’s section 8.30(a),
68
the standard of care provision. As noted above, the commentary
to the Model Act expressly rejects the notion that it codifies the
69
BJR. Nevertheless, courts across the country have ignored the
commentary to section 8.30 and have pronounced that their state’s
70
version of the Model Act is a codification of the BJR. These
examples include courts in states that either have adopted the
71
operative language of section 8.30(a) verbatim or have replicated
72
it with substantially the same language (i.e., states like Alaska).

Institute] test also is based on the objective test of reasonableness, it could be
argued that it is essentially synonymous with the Delaware test. But there is room
to argue that the Delaware test is stricter. . . . In the end, the debate may be mostly
semantic.”).
66. AM. LAW INST., supra note 12, § 4.01(c) cmt. at 173.
67. BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.02.
68. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-176, 8-178 (including a statutory
comparison).
69. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-42 to -43 (2005).
70. E.g., FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (interpreting
California law); IBS Fin. Corp. v. Seidman & Assoc., L.L.C, 136 F.3d 940, 949 (3d
Cir. 1998) (interpreting New Jersey law); In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 603,
606 n.3 (D. Minn. 2004) (interpreting Minnesota law); In re Maresh, 277 B.R. 339,
349 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (interpreting Ohio law); Shoen v. SAC Holding
Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Nev. 2006); Sadler v. Jorad, Inc., 680 N.W.2d 165, 171
(Neb. 2004); Lindner Fund, Inc. v. Waldbaum, Inc., 624 N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y.
2004); Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 836 A.2d 655, 665 (Md. 2003);
Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1091 (Alaska 2002); Simmons v. Miller,
544 S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va. 2001); Hanrahan v. Kruidenier, 473 N.W.2d 184, 186
(Iowa 1991); Jordan v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990, 996 n.3 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993);
Krukemeier v. Krukemeier Mach. & Tool Co., Inc., 551 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1990); Schwarzmann v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Bridgehaven, 655
P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Dunham v. Michael Kane Brick Co., 1994
WL 318936, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).
71. E.g., IOWA CODE § 490.830(1) (2006).
72. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450 (2006).
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These courts mistakenly insist that section 8.30 codifies the BJR,73
when in fact it really codifies the standard of care, an altogether
different concept. This error is especially remarkable because the
American Bar Association’s Model Act expressly denies being a
74
codification of the BJR! And yet these courts have ignored the
drafters’ disavowal of any attempt to codify and have deemed the
75
statute at issue to be a codification of the BJR. Examples of these
cases are provided in the Appendix.
Professor Melvin Eisenberg has said about California’s
76
appellate decisions (specifically Gaillard v. Natomas Co. ) what
this Comment says about the Alaska case law:
[T]he court stated that Corporations Code Section 309 “codifies
California’s business-judgment rule.” This is incorrect. Section
309 codifies the standard of careful conduct, with which the
business-judgment rule is inconsistent.
Indeed, an argument could be made that Section 309 overturns
the business-judgment rule, because the business-judgment rule
is established by case law, while the standard of Section 309,
which is inconsistent with the business-judgment rule, is
statutory. The better position, however, is that although Section
309 does not codify
the business-judgment rule, neither does it
77
overturn the rule.

Other commentators also have noted the confusion of courts and
their failure to distinguish between the statutory standard of care
and the BJR itself. Professor Stuart Cohn, for instance, complains
78
that courts have merged the two doctrinal principles into one.

73. See FDIC, 184 F.3d at 1044 (“California Corporations Code § 309 codifies
California’s business judgment rule.”).
74. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-42 (2005) (“Section 8.30 does not try
to codify the business judgment rule . . . .”).
75. See examples collected in the Appendix.
76. 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“Section 309 codifies
California’s business judgment rule.”) (internal citation omitted).
77. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
WHETHER THE BUSINESS-JUDGMENT RULE SHOULD BE CODIFIED 47–48 & n.20
(1998), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/BKST/BKST-EisenbergBJR.pdf
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007). Professor Eisenberg cites to another example of this
“incorrect” analysis. See Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 87, 95 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“In California, the business judgment rule is
codified in Corporations Code section 309, subdivision (a) . . . .” (citing Gaillard,
256 Cal. Rptr. at 702)); see also Lehman v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 411,
418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“Section 309 . . . codified common law principles, in
particular the business judgment rule.”).
78. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance
of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV.
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However, a few courts have detected the error that so many
jurists are committing. In Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc.,79 for example,
the Washington Court of Appeals recognized the difference
between the standard of care that was enacted in its version of
Model Act section 8.30 and the Business Judgment Rule:
We note that Washington courts and the Seafirst Corp. court
appear to be mistaken in their assumption that RCW 23A.08.343
is a codification of the [BJR]. The comments to the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act (sec. 8.30) indicate that the
statutory language is not intended to be a codification of the
80
[BJR].

The Maryland Court of Appeals showed similar sophistication and
pointed a finger of blame at the Attorney General for failing to
understand the difference:
The Attorney General has interpreted § 2-405.1 to be a
codification of the [BJR] . . . which is a “presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”. . .
Contrary to the opinion of the Attorney General, § 2-405.1 and
the [BJR] differ in that the former is the code of conduct for
corporate directors, while the latter is an aid to judicial
review . . . . Nevertheless, the two do overlap. For example,
proof of the lack of good faith defeats both the presumption of
the [BJR] and the requirements of § 2-405.1(a)(1). The better
position is to view the [BJR] as a presumption
that corporate
81
directors acted in accordance with § 2-405.1.

While there is nationwide error on this point, some courts and
commentators have recognized the important distinction between a
director’s duty of care and the BJR.
IV. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE SHOULD NOT BE CODIFIED
The descriptive analysis above makes it clear that the Business
Judgment Rule has not been codified in Alaska. While this
analysis stands independent from any normative reasons against
591, 604, 617–23 (1983) (lamenting courts’ and commentators’ proclivity to
collapse fully the standard of conduct into the business judgment rule).
79. 786 P.2d 285 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
80. Id. at 290 n.1 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 at 928 (3d ed. 1989
supp.)). The Washington Code, while placing the clauses in a slightly different
sequence, is worded identically to Alaska’s adoption of section 8.30 of the Model
Act. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b)
(2006).
81. Yost v. Early, 589 A.2d 1291, 1298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (internal
citation omitted). The Maryland Code is patterned after the Model Act. See MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1 (2006).
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codification of the BJR, many such reasons exist. Most pressing is
the problem of how to reconcile the disparate versions of the BJR.
There are at least three expressions of the BJR: the formulations of
the Delaware courts, the America Law Institute (ALI), and the
82
Model Act. There is no practical way to codify all three versions
of the BJR, yet each of these three formulations is useful in the
adjudication of certain types of disputes. Indeed, it would be
difficult to synthesize the competing formulations into one single
83
enactment. Who would write it? What form would it take?
These questions illuminate a structural problem inherent in
the codification process. A legislature would no doubt be
influenced by a powerful pro-management lobby that would want
to water down and weaken director liability in any codification of
the BJR, thereby giving greater protections to management. The
risk that the legislature would cave to the corporate lobby is largely
alleviated when the formulation of the BJR is left to the courts.
More important is the substantive problem: the legislature
would have a difficult choice to make between the competing
versions. Professor Eisenberg suggests that the California statute
should be amended to blend ALI section 4.01(c) into its present
84
text. However, he could just as well advance RMBCA section

82. For a comparison, see BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.02; Balotti & Hanks,
supra note 19, at 1337–39. There are, of course, other formulations of the BJR
throughout the above-cited scholarship and case law.
83. The Alaska Code Revision Commission spent a decade revising Chapter
10.05 of the Alaska Statutes, the Alaska’s version of the original Model Act that
was repealed in 1988 and replaced with the current section 10.06, a task supervised
by the Commission’s outside counsel and legal expert, Professor Daniel Fessler of
UC–Davis. When he wrote the definitive article about the new Alaska
Corporations Code, Chapter 10.06, Professor Fessler said nothing about codifying
the Business Judgment Rule, a feat which to corporate scholars would be like
climbing Mt. St. Elias solo or hitting sixty home runs in a single season. See
Daniel William Fessler, The Alaska Corporations Code: The Forty-Ninth State
Claims the Middle Ground, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 51 (1990). Both Professor
Fessler’s law review article and the Commission’s Official Comment are silent
about the BJR and any putative codification. See id.; 1987 H OUSE -S ENATE
J OINT J OURNAL S UPPLEMENT No. 9, 98-101 (May 7, 1987).
84. EISENBERG, supra note 77, at 49–50. Professor Branson has made the
same suggestion for using the ALI proposal to codify the BJR in Hong Kong.
Douglas M. Branson, Balancing the Scales: A Statutory Business Judgment Rule
for Hong Kong?, 34 HONG KONG L.J. 303, 320 (2004) (arguing that “Hong Kong
should adopt a statutory business judgment rule” but mentioning reasons
advanced against codification when it was proposed in Australia). The ALI’s
expression of the BJR has been criticized on the grounds that it is too narrow and
that it removes too much of the director’s safe harbor by injecting requirements of
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8.31 or the operative language from a judicial expression of the
rule, such as Delaware’s formulation in Aronson v. Lewis.85 Indeed,
there are numerous formulations of the BJR in treatises and in the
legal literature. Even if consensus could be achieved, any
codification would necessarily be exclusive to some degree, almost
certainly including conduct that would otherwise be excluded, and
vice-versa.
This leads to the final problem with codification: a legislative
86
The
rule would lack the flexibility of the common law rule.
common law method is able to incorporate and apply social
policies, such as the policy grounds for the BJR, while a legislative
87
rule would be more constrained. It would also be difficult to
avoid the problem of “dueling statutes,” both between the standard
of care and the BJR and among the various states, each of which
would have its own codified version of the rule. In sum, the
88
present common law rule has worked for more than a century. As
the saying goes: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.

reasonable inquiry and rational basis. See Donald E. Pease, Aronson v. Lewis:
When Demand Is Excused and Delaware’s Business Judgment Rule, 9 D EL . J.
C ORP . L. 39, 74–76 & n.177 (1984) (relating criticisms of the Business Roundtable,
an association of chief executive officers of major U.S. companies).
85. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000) (changing the standard of appellate
review from abuse of discretion to de novo). Aronson is the most frequently cited
judicial formulation of the BJR.
86. Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1474, 1480 (1975) (arguing that the creation of a common law rule is an
incremental process of refinement “in which common law precedents are
employed to mold existing remedies to new situations”).
87. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19–51 (1960)
(listing fourteen “strongly stabilizing factors” as reasons why the common law
tradition is superior to other methods of resolving disputes); RICHARD A.
WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION—TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION 75–79 (1961) (noting that legal precedent imposes a restraint upon
judges and limits the variation in judicial decision-making).
88. See E ISENBERG, supra note 26, at 26–37 (explaining the role of policy as
a social proposition in common law reasoning); id. at 27 (noting that “[t]he
administrability policy is that the applicability of a legal rule should not depend on
information of a kind that cannot be reliably determined by courts,” such as the
information directors use in making business decisions); id. at 32 (“policies figure
so pervasively in legal reasoning”).
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V. CONCLUSION: CORPORATE
LAW NEEDS A COURSE CORRECTION
The standard of care that guides directors’ conduct is codified
in almost every state, but the Business Judgment Rule is an
uncodified common law rule that protects the business decisions of
corporate directors and officers when they are brought into court.
Some courts have conflated these two notions. These courts have
mistakenly declared that the standard of care is the BJR, which it
surely is not.
The BJR is important to all corporate directors, officers, and
89
shareholders. It commands special prominence in Alaska because
the state courts frequently are called upon to evaluate, ex post, the
decisions and policies of corporate directors in Alaska Native
corporations. These decisions are a source of frequent and
90
contentious litigation in Alaska. For the sake of all interested
parties, the Alaska Supreme Court should correct the erroneous
dictum in Shields v. Cape Fox that mistakenly refers to a statutory
formulation of the Business Judgment Rule and thereby adopts the
wrong legal standard for determining liability. A correction will
ease the burdens on the lower courts in corporate litigation and will
move Alaska’s corporate jurisprudence towards the mainstream of
modern legal thought. The dozen or more other courts around the
nation that have committed the same error should make the same
course correction.

89. Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 83 n.1 (“The business judgment rule
pervades every aspect of state corporate law, from the review of allegedly
negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to board decisions to
seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.”).
90. See, e.g., Broad v. Sealaska, 85 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving a
shareholders’ challenge to directors’ approval of discriminatory distributions);
Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc., 45 P.3d 1208, 1211 n.3 (Alaska 2002) (involving
whether directors can favor local shareholders, including directors’ relatives, in a
corporate hire program); Sierra v. Goldbelt, 25 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2000) (involving
whether directors must disclose their resolution when asking shareholders to
approve amendment to articles of incorporation); Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp.,
939 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1997) (involving a shareholders’ challenge to directors’
adoption of a discriminatory life insurance program for local, original
shareholders); Moses v. McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1980) (involving a
shareholders’ challenge to the annual meeting and election of directors); Aleut
Corp. v. McGarvey, 573 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1978) (involving a dispute about
election of directors). Of course, Shields fits into this category as well.
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Appendix: Examples from case law in
which courts mistakenly have said the BJR is codified:
State
AK†

Case

Statute

Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083,
1091 n. 31 (Alaska 2002).

ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.450(b)

Lehman v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d
411, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Barnes v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 95 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal.
Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also
FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th
Cir. 1999).

CAL. CORP.
CODE § 309

CT†‡

Dunham v. Michael Kane Brick Co., 1994
WL 318936 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994).

CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 33313(d)

IA†

Hanrahan v. Kruidenier, 473 N.W.2d 184,
186 (Iowa 1991).

IOWA CODE §
490.830

ID†‡

Jordan v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990, 996 n.3
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993).

IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 30-1-35

IN†

Krukemeier v. Krukemeier Machine & Tool
Co., 551 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. Ct. App.
1990).

IND. CODE §
23-1-35-1

MD†

Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp, 836
A.2d 655, 665 (Md. 2003).

MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS.
& ASS’NS § 2405.1

MN†‡

In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 603, 606
n.3 (D. Minn. 2004).

MINN. STAT. §
302A.251 (1)

Sadler v. Jorad, Inc., 680 N.W.2d 165, 171
(Neb. 2004).

NEB. REV.
STAT. § 212095

CA†

NE†
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State

Case

NJ†

IBS Financial Corp. v. Seidman & Associates,
LLC, 136 F.3d 940, 949 (3d Cir. 1998).

N.J. STAT.
ANN. §
14A:6-14

NV**

Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171,
1179 n. 11 (Nev. 2006).

NEV. REV.
STAT. §
78.138(3)

NY†

Lindner Fund, Inc. v. Waldbaum, Inc., 624
N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y. 2004).

N.Y. BUS.
CORP. LAW
§ 717(a)

OH†‡

In re Maresh, 277 B.R. 339, 349 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2001).

OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §
1701.59(B)

VA**

Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va.
2001).

VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1690

Schwarzmann v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners
of Bridgehaven, 655 P.2d 1177, 1180 n.1
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982).

WASH. REV.
CODE §
92
23A.08.343

WA†‡

91

Statute

91. See also Seafirst Corp. v. Jenkins, 644 F. Supp. 1152, 1159 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (interpreting Washington law and making the same mistake); Shinn v.
Thrust IV, Inc., 786 P.2d 285, 290 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the
Seafirst court mistakenly assumed that the Washington statute codified the BJR).
92. This statute was repealed after Schwarzmann was decided and was
reenacted as WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300(1) (2006), which is worded
identically to the Alaska Statute.
† Has adopted the principal operative language of MBCA § 8.30(a): “Each
member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall
act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation.”
‡ Has adopted language identical to that which Alaska has adopted in
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b).
** Has adopted language similar to MBCA § 8.30(a).

